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Abstract
This paper analyses the role of information in the search process. I
build a simple model of a good with two random attributes with some
joint probability distribution. I consider seemingly unimportant changes
in this distribution, i.e. changes which neither affect expected utility nor
its variance. These changes have a great impact on the search behaviour:
the customer may start to search the characteristics and buy the good
even if she did not do so before. The optimal search rule is derived and
the model is generalized to multiple objects.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the role of information and interdepen-
dencies in the search process.
Consider a situation where you are planning to buy a book. You can read
reviews on two different websites, say amazon.co.uk and amazon.com, and you
are only interested in a book if it has positive reviews on both websites. Of
course, reading reviews costs you some time. If you know that English readers
are generally more skeptical than American readers, which website should you
search first? Can it be optimal to stop and buy a book after searching just one
site?
One can also think about an investment decision problem. Suppose the
research department of a large company has to find out whether to buy a par-
ticular firm or to launch a new technology. The true value of the firm (the
benefits of the technology) is unknown, and depends on two unknown parame-
ters. For example, to calculate the value of the firm it is necessary to estimate
future cash flows, and therefore it is necessary both to assess how the firm’s
costs will evolve and to predict demand fluctuations. These two factors are
obviously somewhat correlated, at least due to mutual macroeconomic factors
in prediction, such as the GDP growth rate or inflation. An accurate forecast
can be quite costly and require both internal and external resources (such as
marketing forecasts). Which of the parameters should the company research?
What is the optimal order? Or perhaps some of the parameters do not require
detailed investigation? For example, in an economy with high inflation both
costs and revenues should follow the same pattern which is predetermined by
the inflation rate.
What these examples have in common is that a researcher investigates some
object with unknown attributes which she values. The researcher can investigate
the attributes, and after learning one or more of their values she can either accept
the object (buy, launch investment, etc.) or decline. Then the decision about
the optimal investigation procedure is based on two factors: (i) utility concern,
which is the value of a particular attribute for the researcher; (ii) informational
concern, which is how knowing the true value of one attribute may provide
information about the other.
If one attribute functionally determines the value of the other, it might be
optimal to research the former first to save on further investigation costs, even
if it is not particularly important from a utility point of view. More generally,
if knowing the value of one attribute generates some information about another
attribute, then an interesting search issue appears.
One of the obvious particular cases of this situation is when a customer
wants to buy a bundle of goods and the price of each good is unknown (here
prices play the role of attributes in the indirect utility function). This situation
is quite well-studied in the literature. Burdett and Malueg (1981) and Carlson
and McAfee (1984) studied optimal search rules for several commodities given
various recall assumptions. However, in their setup the customer observes the
entire price vector once she enters the store. Anglin (1990) pointed out that
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though the goods are consumed jointly, the customer can make a disjoint search
for prices. Unfortunately all the results in the multicommodity search literature
are based on the assumption of independent price distributions which makes it
impossible to study the informational aspect of the problem. In reality searching
for prices within a store is costly, and prices of different goods can be correlated.
The customer’s optimal search decision then can be based on informational
concerns. This paper attempts to cover this gap in the literature.
Moreover, most of consumer search literature (see, for example, Kohn and
Shavell (1974)) assumes that the consumer who searches learns the exact value
of the good. This is not a very realistic assumption: quite often the true value
of a good is revealed to the customer after the purchase, because a thorough
investigation of all the characteristics of the good is too time consuming and
costly. Hey and McKenna (1981) study such a model with two characteristics:
price and quality. However, in their model the search costs for the quality are
infinite, it cannot be explored prior to purchase. In this paper decision whether
to investigate the value of “quality” prior to purchase or not is endogenous.
To focus on the value of information, I develop a simple model. First, I study
a research process with one object. The object possesses two random attributes
with a known joint distribution1. The researcher can investigate these attributes
sequentially at some cost. The paper studies how the dependency between the
attributes affects the optimal search (investigation) decision. To facilitate the
analysis I consider a situation where each attribute can take either an acceptable
or an unacceptable value and the researcher accepts the object only if both
attributes are acceptable. Moreover, the utility function is symmetric between
the attributes to eliminate the utility concern and so are the research costs.
Symmetry of the utility function allows me to concentrate on the informational
concern mentioned above. Finally, I consider a specific class of probability
measures, such that the expectation and the variance of utility are constant for
all measures in the class.
I characterize the optimal investigation rule, which is quite counterintuitive:
it is optimal to first investigate the attribute with the lowest probability of tak-
ing on an acceptable value. After that I show that any probability distribution
which is asymmetric between the attributes is preferred by the searcher to the
symmetric one. Moreover, changes in seemingly absolutely irrelevant informa-
tion can be crucial for search behaviour, i.e. probabilities of unacceptable values
of the attributes (given constant utility and risk), in other words probabilities
of various outcomes when the searcher would not accept the good anyway. In
particular, the researcher may switch from non-researching to research, which
in the case of consumer search may result in a purchase.
I also consider what would happen if there are multiple objects. Say Mr.
Abramovich wants to buy a football club, he considers a few clubs in Premier
League and each club varies in players and fan base. Weitzman (1979) derived
1The study of objects with n attributes is also possible. However, it requires an opti-
mization over all possible search sequences which is a problem of combinatorial complexity.
Analysis of the n = 2 case shows the main ideas without obscuring them with algebraic
complications.
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the optimal search rule for objects with different distributions. The results
of a single object search problem can be generalized using the same logic as
Weitzman. The optimal search rule between the objects is characterized by
reservation values, while within the object the researcher should follow the re-
sults developed for the single object. Moreover, once the researcher starts to
investigate one object she never switches to another one unless she discover an
unacceptable value of some attribute.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model of
the object with two attributes. Analysis the of single object case is presented
in section 3, the investigation process with multiple objects is considered in
section 4. Section 5 concludes. An interested reader can find the analysis of the
continuous case of the model in the appendix.
2 Single Object: A Model
The object has two attributes: a ∈ {A,A} and b ∈ {B,B} which affect the
researcher’s utility. Thus, there are four possible types of the object. Each type
can appear with a certain probability. The researcher is only interested in the
object of type AB, i.e. then both the attributes take acceptable values. The
utility function is symmetric, so the researcher values objects of type AB and
AB equally, and has no utility grounds to prefer investigation of attribute a to
attribute b.
The structure of the model is represented by the following two matrices.
Utilities
B B
A u2 u1
A u1 u0
Probabilities
B B
A α γ
A δ β
Specification of the utility function is summarized by the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 2.1. u(AB) = u2, u(AB) = u(BA) = u1, u(A,B) = u0 with
u2 > 0 > u1 ≥ u0.
Utilities in the matrix are net of price (investments, etc.) After at least one
attribute has been investigated the researcher can either accept or reject the
object. If the object is rejected, the researcher gets reservation utility which I
assume to be equal zero, if it is accepted she gets the utility corresponding to
the type of the object.
Probabilities of the outcomes are presented in the above probability matrix.
At cost c the researcher can investigate whether ω ∈ A (if not then obviously
ω ∈ A), and then I say that she investigates attribute a. For the same cost she
can investigate whether ω ∈ B, and then I say that she investigates attribute b.
To avoid utility-specific effects I consider a specific class of probability mea-
sures, which is characterized by constant probabilities of outcomes AB and AB.
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Definition 2.2. Let M(α, β) be the class of probability measures such that
P (AB) = α, P (AB) = β, α+ β < 1.
Lemma 2.3. For any probability measure µ ∈M(α, β)
Eu = αu2 + (1− α− β)u1 + βu0 (1)
Var(u) = α(u2 − Eu)2 + (1− α− β)(u1 − Eu)2 + β(u0 − Eu)2 (2)
Therefore, all µ ∈ M(α, β) are characterized by the same expected utility
and risk. Thus, focusing on symmetric utility functions and µ ∈M(α, β) allows
me to study the impact of information and dependencies on the investigator’s
behaviour.
3 Single Object: Analysis
The expectation and the variance of utility do not depend on (γ, δ). If (α, β)
are fixed, the model is characterized by one degree of freedom γ (since δ =
1− α− β − γ).
Intuitively, it seems that the value of γ should not play a relevant role in the
model, since:
1. whatever the value of γ is, both expected utility and risk are constant;
2. changing the value of γ corresponds to changing the probabilities of two
events with the same level of utility;
3. changing the value of γ corresponds to changing the probabilities of two
events with negative utility, i.e. events when the searcher does not accept
the object.
However, given that investigation of the attributes is possible, the intuition
that the value of γ is irrelevant is incorrect. To illustrate this I derive an optimal
investigation rule, and show that it heavily depends on γ, namely on how far
the value of γ stays form the symmetric case γ0 = δ0 = 1−α−β2 . The value of γ
drives not only the optimal investigation order but sometimes can influence the
decision whether to start research at all.
Consider a rational research process. Suppose the researcher decides first
to investigate an attribute a. She pays c and observes whether the object is of
type A or A. In the latter case it is optimal to terminate the investigation and
reject the object, because the best she can get is u1 < 0. In the former case she
can either accept the object immediately or investigate an attribute b. If she
decides to proceed, she pays c and observes b. If b = B she accepts, and if b = B
she rejects. Thus, given the optimal behaviour, the value of the investigation
process started with the attribute a denoted as Va can be written as
Va = −c+P (A)max(P (B|A)u2+P (B|A)u1, P (B|A)(u2−c)+P (B|A)(−c)) (3)
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Or equivalently
Va = −c+max(αu2 + γu1, α(u2 − c)− cγ) (4)
If the investigation order is to first investigate b and then a, the value of the
investigation process denoted as Vb is:
Vb = −c+max(αu2 + (1− α− β − γ)u1, α(u2 − c)− c(1− α− β − γ)) (5)
This allows me to formulate the following result:
Theorem 3.1 (Optimal investigation rule). The optimal investigation rule
is:
• if max(αu2+γu1, α(u2− c)− cγ, αu2+(1−α−β−γ)u1, α(u2− c)− c(1−
α− β − γ)) < c then do not search;
• otherwise:
– if γ < 1−α−β2 it is optimal to investigate a first;
– if γ > 1−α−β2 it is optimal to investigate b first;
– if γ = 1−α−β2 both investigation orders yield the same expected utility;
– if the researcher knows that the object is of type A then it is optimal
to investigate the object further if u1 <
−c(α+γ)
γ , and to terminate
the investigation and accept the object otherwise;
– if the researcher knows the object is of type B then it is optimal to
invetigate the object further if u1 <
−c(1−β−γ)
1−α−β−γ and to terminate the
investigation and accept the object otherwise;
– if after the first investigation the researcher realizes that the object is
either of type A or B then it is optimal to terminate the investigation
and refrain from accepting.
Proof. The proof comes naturally from comparing the benefits in different cases.
If max(Va, Vb) < 0 then it is optimal not to search. By expanding this inequality
we get max(αu2+γu1, α(u2− c)− cγ, αu2+(1−α−β−γ)u1, α(u2− c)− c(1−
α− β − γ)) < c.
If max(Va, Vb) > 0 then it is optimal to investigate the attributes in the order
which gives the highest expected value. Thus, if Va > Vb it is optimal to start
with a. Va > Vb if and only if γ < 1−α−β2 . If an attribute a was investigated
and a = A then it is optimal to terminate the search because u0 < u1 < 0.
The same holds for b. If a = A, then it is optimal to continue the research if
αu2 + γu1 < α(u2 − c) − cγ, or equivalently u1 < −c(α+γ)γ . The analysis for
b = B is exactly the same.
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Note that the optimal investigation rule possesses quite a counterintuitive
property: it is optimal to investigate an attribute with the lowest probability of
taking on a positive value. Indeed, the probability of a = A is α + γ, and the
probability b = B is 1−β−γ. It is optimal to investigate a first when γ < 1−α−β2
which implies that α + γ < 1 − β − γ. The idea behind this fact is that the
researcher sacrifices the high probability of a positive outcome in the first step
for a more favorable probability distribution in the next step. In the case when it
is optimal to explore both attributes before accepting the object the idea which
drives the result is quite clear: the researcher tries to minimize the expected
costs of investigation and therefore maximizes the probability to stop after the
first investigation round. In the case when it is optimal to stop just after the
first round (in some cases the second search can be simply prohibited due to
lack of time, etc.) pure informational concerns play role: the researcher faces
more favourable distribution in the second round (maximizes the probability of
correct choice) at the cost of lower a probability in the first round.
It is important to emphasize that the value of γ affects the optimal investi-
gation rule. Thus this information is not irrelevant given that investigation of
the object is possible. Theorem 3.1 shows how the value of γ affects the opti-
mal investigation order. The following proposition illustrates the importance of
this information for the customer’s preferences over distributions and welfare.
Let’s denote the value of the search process by V (γ) = max(Va(γ), Vb(γ), 0),
and γ0 = 1−α−β2
Proposition 3.2. For any µ ∈ M(α, β) V (γ) ≥ V (γ0). If γ2 ≤ γ1 ≤ γ0 or
γ2 ≥ γ1 ≥ γ0 then V (γ2) ≥ V (γ1).
Proof. Note that Va(γ0) = Vb(γ0) and Va is a decreasing function of γ, while
Vb is an increasing. Therefore max(Va(γ), Vb(γ)) ≥ max(Va(γ0), Vb(γ0)). In the
same way, since either Va(γ2) ≥ Va(γ1) or Vb(γ2) ≥ Vb(γ1), the value of search
V (γ2) ≥ V (γ1).
Thus the researcher would prefer to have an asymmetric distribution to
a symmetric one, and the more asymmetric the better. The reason is that
given a positive outcome of investigation of the first attribute, the quality of
information increases and the conditional probability distribution becomes more
favorable. If the researcher prefers say extremely low values of γ to moderate
ones it is reasonable to assume that for some γ close to γ0 it is optimal not
to search and to get reservation utility of zero, while for extreme values of γ
it is optimal to start research and probably accept the object (buy the good,
launch the investments). Thus, the seemingly irrelevant γ can dramatically
affect the researcher’s behaviour. Formally this result is shown in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.3. There is a pair (c, γ) such that V (γ) > 0 > V (γ0).
Proof. First, note that Va(γ0) = Vb(γ0). By expanding the expression of the
value of the search we get that V (γ0) < 0 if c > max
(
αu2 + γ0u1, u21+α+γ0
)
.
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Note, that the right hand side of this expression is a decreasing continuous
function of γ. Therefore it is possible to choose c and γ in such a way that
max
(
αu2 + γu1,
u2
1 + α+ γ
)
> c > max
(
αu2 + γ0u1,
u2
1 + α+ γ0
)
with V (γ) > 0.
Thus, the value of γ affects the optimal research order and sometimes can
affect the decision to investigate itself. The researcher prefers probability dis-
tributions which are further from symmetric ones.
4 Multiple Objects
A search problem with multiple objects can be quite interesting. For example,
in times of crisis a major financial company decides to take over one of the banks
which has experienced some trouble. Each bank can be characterized by multiple
attributes which affect the final decision. What is the optimal investigation
rule? Weitzman (1979) showed that it is optimal to explore objects in order of
reservation values. However, if each of the objects has a complex structure and
there is a possibility to investigate the object itself, the reservation value has to
be redefined. A situation when one object is partially explored (one attribute
is known) deserves a particular interest. I show that it is never optimal to
stop investigation and switch to another object if the attribute explored has a
positive value. This section provides a study of the attribute search problem
with multiple objects.
Assume there are multiple objects which satisfy the assumptions described
above, i.e. they posses symmetric attributes (which in principle can be dif-
ferent in nature between objects). Then each object is characterized by a set
(u1i, u2i, u3i, αi, βi, γi, ci), i = 1, n is the object index. Attributes are indepen-
dent between objects. Let Vi = max(Vai, Vbi) be an expected value given the
optimal order of search of the attributes. For simplicity of notation assume that
it is optimal to investigate a first for all the objects. and thus Vi = Via. Of
course, attributes can be renamed in such a way that this holds for each object.
Assume that the researcher has some “sure thing” as a result of previous
search, and denote it by zi. Assume by now that only object i is left unexplored.
Of course, if zi 6= 0 the value of investigation changes in part which deals with
reservation object. To take this into account let’s denote
V˜ai(zi) = −ci +max(αiu2i + γiu1i, αi(u2i − ci) + (zi − ci)γi) (6)
V˜bi(zi) = −ci +max(αiu2i + δiu1i, αi(u2i − ci) + (zi − ci)δi) (7)
where δi = 1−αi−βi−γi. It is clear that if Vai ≥ Vbi then V˜ai(zi) ≥ V˜bi(zi)
for all zi and vice versa. If she searches object i in the optimal way the expected
benefits equal
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max(V˜ai(zi + P (A)izi, V˜bi + P (B)izi) (8)
Note that from theorem 3.1 it follows that if Vai ≥ Vbi then P (A)i ≥ P (B)i.
Therefore, since zi ≥ 0
max(V˜ai(zi) + P (A)izi, V˜bi(zi) + P (B)izi) = V˜ai(zi) + P (A)izi
The researcher is indifferent between researching and non-researching if V˜ai(zi)+
P (A)izi = zi. Therefore each object is characterized by the reservation value
zi = max
(
αiu2i + γiu1i − ci
αi + γi
,
αiu2i − (1 + αi + γi)ci
αi
)
(9)
Weitzman (1979) proved that it is optimal to search objects in the order
of reservation values: from the highest zi in descending order. Note that the
search order in general is different from the order of expected values given the
optimal search {Vi}ni=1, so it can be that Vi > Vj but it is still optimal to search
j before i.
It is clear that if object i is searched and an unacceptable value of an attribute
is discovered, it is optimal to search another object or to terminate search if no
object are left. But what if the first attribute takes the acceptable value? Let’s
denote a reservation value after a positive outcome in the first round (a = A) by
z˜i. If it is optimal to terminate the search and buy without looking at attribute
b then z˜istop =
αiu2i+γiu1i−ci
αi+γi
. If it is optimal to search for b before buying,
object i is characterized by new reservation value z˜i is defined by:
αiu2i
αi + γi
+
γiz˜i
αi + γi
− ci = z˜i (10)
and then
z˜ib =
αiu2i − ci(αi + γi)
αi
(11)
Therefore
z˜i = max
(
αiu2i + γiu1i
αi + γi
,
αiu2i − (αi + γi)ci
αi
)
(12)
Lemma 4.1. If a = A, it is optimal either to terminate the search and accept
the object, or search for another attribute of the same object.
Proof. The lemma holds if z˜i > zi, which is true because
αiu2i + γiu1i
αi + γi
>
αiu2i + γiu1i − ci
αi + γi
and
αiu2i − (αi + γi)ci
αi
>
αiu2i − (1 + αi + γi)ci
αi
9
The lemma shows that once the searcher has got a positive search result
about characteristic a, the reservation value of the object is not decreasing and
therefore it is optimal to search this object further. This allows me to formulate
the optimal search rule for multicommodity research.
Theorem 4.2 (Optimal investigation rule with multiple objects). The
optimal investigation rule is:
• start with the object with the highest zi;
• if max(αiu2i+γiu1i, αi(u2i−ci)−ciγi, αiu2i+(1−αi−βi−γi)u1i, αi(u2i−
ci)− ci(1− αi − βi − γi)) < ci, then terminate the investigation;
• otherwise:
– if γi < 1−αi−βi2 it is optimal to investigate a first;
– if γi > 1−αi−βi2 it is optimal to investigate b first;
– if γi = 1−αi−βi2 both research orders yield the same expected utility;
– if the researcher knows that the object is of type A, then it is opti-
mal to investigate further if u1i <
−ci(αi+γi)
γi
and to terminate the
investigation and accept the object otherwise;
– if the searcher knows that object is of type B, then it is optimal to
investigate further if u1i <
−ci(1−βi−γi)
1−αi−βi−γi and to terminate the inves-
tigation and accept the object otherwise;
– if after the first investigation the researcher realizes that the object is
either of type A or B then it is optimal proceed with the object with
the highest zi among the objects left or to terminate the investigation
if there are no more objects.
5 Conclusions
This papers illustrates the importance of information contained in one attribute
of a good about another one. Even if two probability distributions provide the
same expected utility and risk, the researcher might prefer one over another
if she possesses the possibility of investigation of the attributes. Moreover, a
change in the probability distribution which preserves the mean and variance of
utility and only affects probabilities of outcomes when the researcher does not
accept the object can dramatically affect her behaviour. She may switch from
passive non-investigating (and hence rejection of the object) behaviour to active
investigation, which might result in the acceptence of the object: purchase of
a good, launching an investment project. The results can be illustrated for
different distributions and utility functions, and the interested reader can find
the continuous case with a uniform distribution in the appendix. The model
allows one to consider the investigation problem with several heterogeneous
objects, and the results preserve all essential properties of the single object
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solution. The results of the paper can potentially be embedded in an equilibrium
setup, when the firms make decisions about characteristics of the products (say,
price and quality) or prices of two goods.
Appendix
For the sake of simplicity, in the main body of the paper I restricted myself
to the case where characteristics take binary values. However A and A can be
considered as two regions where the utility function takes different signs. Here
I show that though utility may not be constant over these regions, the analysis
and results stay essentially the same. To do this I look at a continuous case:
each attribute is a continuous variable bounded between zero and one.
Consider an example where attributes can take continuous values. Let
(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 be a characteristic space and u = xy − p be a utility func-
tion, where p < 1/2 is the price of the good. Initially we assume that (x, y) are
uniformly distributed.
It is obvious that if one of the characteristics is less then p, the researcher is
never going to accept the object. Let us transform the probability distribution
in this area in the following way: we set P(x ≤ p, y ≥ p) = 0 and double density
for x ≥ p, y ≤ p. See the figure for details.
Figure 1: Values of density function and reservation utility level
-
6
p
p
1
1
y
x
0 1
1 2
As before, assume that the researcher is allowed to investigate only one
attribute, and then he has to make a decision.
1. x is investigated first, then y.
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(a) Given value of x density functions for y are:
• x ≤ p
f(y) =
{
1/p if y ≤ p
0 if y > p (13)
• x > p
f(y) =
{ 2
1+p if y ≤ p
1
1+p if y > p
(14)
(b) The expected value of utility function conditional on x is:
• x ≤ p
Eu =
1
p
∫ p
0
(xy − p) dy = p
2
x− p < 0 (15)
• x > p
Eu =
1
1 + p
∫ 1
0
(xy − p) dy + 1
1− p
∫ p
0
(xy − p) dy
=
1
1 + p
[
1 + p2
2
x− (p+ p2)
] (16)
Note, that the object is accepted only if expected utility is greater
than 0, therefore
x >
2(p+ p2)
1 + p2
(17)
and the RHS is greater than p.
(c) The density function of x is
f(x) =
{
p if x ≤ p
1 + p if x > p (18)
(d) Expected utility of research equals to
Eu = (1 + p)
∫ 1
2(p+p2)
1+p2
1
1 + p
[
1 + p2
2
x− (p+ p2)
]
dx
=
(1− 2p− p2)2
4(1 + p2)
(19)
2. y is investigated first, then x.
(a) Given the value of y the density functions for x are:
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• y ≤ p
f(x) =
{ 1
2−p if x ≤ p
2
2−p if x > p
(20)
• y > p
f(x) =
{
0 if x ≤ p
1
1−p if x > p
(21)
(b) The expected value of utility function conditional on y is:
• y ≤ p
Eu =
1
2− p
∫ 1
0
(xy − p) dx+ 1
2− p
∫ 1
p
(xy − p) dx
=
1
2− p
[
2− p2
2
y − (2p− p2)
]
< 0
(22)
• y > p
Eu =
1
1− p
∫ 1
p
(xy − p) dx = 1 + p
2
y − p (23)
Note, that the object is accepted only if expected utility is greater
than 0, therefore
y >
2p
1 + p
(24)
and the RHS is greater than p.
(c) The density function of y is
f(y) =
{
2− p if y ≤ p
1− p if y > p (25)
(d) Expected utility of search equals to
Eu =
1
1 + 2p
∫ 1
2p
1−p
[
1− p
2
y − p
]
dy
=
(1− p)3
4(1 + p)
(26)
3. It is easy to check that
(1− p)3
4(1 + p)
>
(1− 2p− p2)2
4(1 + p2)
(27)
Thus, the key properties of the optimal investigation rule are preserved in
the continuous setup. The investigator still prefers to look at the attribute with
the lowest probability of an acceptable outcome first.
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